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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee / Respondent,
Case No. 20100291-SC

vs.
TINA HARDING,
Appellant / Petitioner,

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(a).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the majority of the panel of the Utah court of appeals erred in its analysis
and/or application of the Fourth Amendment standards governing the apparent authority
of a person to consent to the search of another person's property? On certiorari, this
Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to
the appeals court. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11, 103 P.3d 699. Furthermore, the
standard of review for search and seizure cases is the same non-deferential, correctness
standard. Id. at Tf 15.

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of Petitioner's Brief

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Tina Harding appeals from affirmation of her conviction by the Utah Court of

Appeals. She entered conditional pleas to possession of a controlled substance, a second
degree felony, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third
degree felony in Fourth District Court.
B.

Trial Court and Court of Appeals Proceedings and Disposition
Tina Harding was charged by criminal information filed on March 3, 2008 in

Fourth District Court with: Count 1 - possession or use of a controlled substance in a
drug free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-378(2)(a)(i); Count 2 -purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10503(2)(b); Count 3 - giving false personal information to a peace officer, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-507(2); and Count 4 possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5 (R. 02-01). At the preliminary hearing held on
March 19, 2008, the Court found probable cause and the charges were bound over for
trial (R. 24-22).
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Harding filed a motion to suppress on April 25, 2008 alleging that while the traffic
stop was legitimate, the search exceeded the scope of the detention and was in violation
of Harding's right to privacy in her personal belongings (R. 45-33). At the request of the
Court, the parties submitted briefs on the suppression issue in relation to State v Hansen,
2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002) (R. 113: 3-4). Argument on the motion was heard
on June 4, 2008 and the trial court took the matter under advisement (R. 114).
On June 12, 2008, the trial court denied Harding's motion to suppress (R. 77-68).
The court ruled that the stop had de-escalated to a consensual encounter and therefore,
the search of the vehicle did not exceed the scope of the detention (R. 74-71). The court
also ruled that Harding's expectation of privacy became irrelevant because the search of
the bags was legal (R. 71). The court concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the
officer to conclude that the bags were part of the consent given and that the search was
lawful (R. 70).
On June 25, 2008, Harding entered conditional pleas ol guilt guilty to Count 1 illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, and Count 2 possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony (R. 84-81,
98-96).
On August 6, 2008, Harding was given suspended sentences of one to fifteen years
in prison for illegal possession or use of a controlled substance and up to five years in
prison for possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, ordered to spend 166
days in the Utah County Jail with credit granted for time served, placed on probation for
36 months, and ordered to pay $15000 fine suspended to $1|60, plus interest (R. 103-93).
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On August 29, 2008, a Notice of Appeal was filed with the Fourth District Court
(R. 106).
On January 22, 2010, a majority of the court of appeals panel affirmed Harding's
convictions, concluding that it was reasonable for police to believe that the driver, a third
party, had authority to consent to the search of Harding's bags. State v. Harding, 2010
UT App 8, \ 19, 223 P.3d 1148. Judge Thome wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. atffif2229. The State filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied by the court of appeals on
February 8, 2010.
This Court subsequently granted Harding's petition for writ of certiorari.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On February 22, 2008 at approximately 9:30 p.m. Officer Jeffery Westerman

initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle (1997 Chevrolet SUV Blazer) for an inoperable plate
lamp at 100 North 500 West in Provo (Pv. 112: 4).
2.

Westerman was told by the driver, Kimberly Stacy, that her license was suspended

(R. 112: 5). He ran a routine check and discovered that her driver's license had been
denied (R. 112:5).
3.

Westerman requested the names and dates of birth or identification from the other

three passengers in order to ascertain whether there was a licensed driver among them
who could drive the vehicle from the scene (R. 112: 5). Tina Harding was the backseat
passenger on the driver's side.
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4.

None of the passengers had a valid driver's license anjl Harding initially gave her

name as Ruth Rascom (R. 112:6, 7). Her true identity was subsequently obtained during
the stop (R. 112:6).
5.

Westerman testified that he did not observe any signs of impairment on the driver

or the passengers (R. 112: 13).
6.

Westerman had the driver exit the vehicle, issued her a citation for the plate lamp

and for the denied driver's license, and instructed her on hoW to fix her driver's license
(R. 112: 7). He also told the driver that she was free to leave) (R. 112: 14). At this time
the passengers were still in the vehicle (R. 112: 14, 15).
7.

The driver subsequently "came back" with another comment or question.

Westerman asked if he could look in the vehicle, and she consented (R. 112: 7-8, 14).
Westerman had already called for backup because of the "nervousness of the
passengers," and Officer Lasenby arrived to assist (R. 112: ^5).
8.

Westerman then asked the passengers to "step out of the vehicle" (R. 112: 15). He

testified the passengers were free to leave. However, his statement to them was that "if
they wanted to wait with that other officer, while [he] took a| look in the vehicle" (R. 112:
15). His arrest report read that he asked the passengers to exit the vehicle and "began the
consent search of the vehicle. Officer Lazenby was watching the passengers and the
driver of the vehicle" (R. 43).
9.

Westerman searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle (R. 112: 8).

Directly behind the area where Harding was seated was a small space for storage where
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two bags were located (R. 112: 8, 16). Westerman did not ask whom the bags belonged
to before he searched them (R. 112: 16).
10.

The bags contained items specific to Harding, including mail, photos on a digital

camera that corresponded to photos from her phone, a pink brazier, along with a black air
soft gun, a torch and torch tips, plastic baggies of assorted sizes, butane fuel, digital
scales which field tested positive for methamphetamine, a glass pipe with burnt
marijuana residue, and a spoon with methamphetamine residue (R. 112: 9-10). In
addition, methamphetamine was found in three plastic baggies, along with lithium,
clindomycin and generic xanex pills (R. 112: 10-11).
11.

Harding was subsequently searched. A "bio sheet" was found on her person along

with a lock blade knife with a three-inch blade (R. 112: 11). She was arrested and given
her Miranda warnings (R. 112: 18-19).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court and majority of the court of appeals erred in concluding that the
driver had apparent authority to consent to the search of Harding's property. Under these
facts, it was not reasonable for Officer Westerman to execute a warrantless search of
those bags, based solely on the driver's consent. At best, Officer Westerman was
presented with a situation where ownership and control of the bags was ambiguous. The
Fourth Amendment and Utah law require that he make further inquiry before proceeding
with a warrantless search of the property. Accordingly, Harding requests that this Court
reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the denial of her motion to suppress.
6

ARGUMENT
THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE DRIVER HAD APPARENT AUTHORITY TO CONSENT TO THE
SEARCH OF HARDING'S PROPERTY

Harding asserts that the evidence obtained from her property within the vehicle
must be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment because even if the driver's consent to
search the vehicle was valid, the driver's authority to consent did not extend to a search
of Harding's property in the car.1
A.

Summary of Proceedings in Lower Courts
The trial court concluded that it was "undisputed that Ms. Harding preserved a

legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags because she neyer abandoned them.
However, whether or not Ms. Harding had a legitimate expectation of privacy becomes
irrelevant if Officer Westerman's search of the bags was legal" (R. 71). In reaching its
decision to deny Harding's motion to suppress, the trial court relied upon the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Florida v. Jimeno. 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114
L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). The trial court concluded:
There is no indication in the record that Ms. Harding objected to the search of her
bags or attempted to take those bags with her when she exited the vehicle. Given
those circumstances, Officer Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they
were; he just proceeded to search the contents of the vehicle. As the Supreme
court explained in Jimeno, it is objectively reasonable for an officer to search a
1

The State stipulated before the trial court that Harding had standing to challenge the
search of her bags because she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bags and did
not abandon them. R. 70. See also, Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at ^f 11-12. See also
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L.Ed.2d408 (1999)
(Passengers in automobiles possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in their own
belongings).
7

container 4which might bear drugs.' Bags in a vehicle could certainly contain
drugs, so Officer Westerman's search of Ms. Harding's bags was objectively
reasonable. Thus Ms. Harding's bags were not beyond the scope of the consent
given to search the vehicle
(R. 70). However, in denying Harding's suppression motion, the trial court also found
that "Officer Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they were; he just
proceeded to search the contents of the vehicle" (R. 70).
The majority of the court of appeals agreed and affirmed the denial of Harding's
motion to suppress. State v. Harding, 2010 UT App 8, 223 P.3d 1148. The court of
appeals concluded that it was reasonable for police to believe that the driver had authority
to consent to the search of the bags because: there was nothing on or about the bags to
indicate they belonged to anyone else, neither the driver nor the passengers informed the
officer of where they had been or where they were going nor did they state the bags
belonged to anyone other than the driver, and no one objected to the search. Id. at \ 19.
"Under these circumstances," the majority concluded, "it was objectively reasonable for
Officer Westerman to believe the bags belonged to the driver. Any belief that the bags
belonged to one of the passengers would necessarily be based on speculation. On the
other hand, it is patently reasonable to believe that a car owner would toss or place bags
or other items in a small storage area of a car, located behind the passenger seat. We
therefore conclude that... search of [Harding's] bags was lawful." Id.
Judge Thorne, on the other hand, dissented. One, because "It is undisputed in this
case that the driver did not have actual authority to consent to the search of [Harding's]
bags. Thus, in order for the State to justify the search, it must demonstrate that the facts
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known to Officer Westerman would nevertheless have caused a person of reasonable
caution to conclude that the driver had such authority." Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at ^f 25
(citing State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, ^ 14, 131 P.3d 246, affirmed, 2007 UT 23, 156
P.3d 795 and Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d
148 (1990)). Two, because the trial court expressly found that the officer had no way of
knowing who the bags belonged to, and "the only indicia of ownership or control of the
bags was their mere presence in the driver's vehicle, along with multiple passengers and
in an area accessible to those passengers." Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at ^ 22, 25. Under
these known facts, Thorne concluded, that "[a]t best, Officer Westerman was presented
with a situation where ownership and control of the bag was ambiguous. Utah law
requires further inquiry before a consent search can be deemed valid in such ambiguous
situations." Id. at f 26 (citing Duron, 2005 UT App 409 at \ 17, and State v. Davis, 965
P.2d 525, 533 (Utah App. 1998), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999)). Westerman
made no further inquiry and therefore, he lacked a reasonable belief as to the driver's
ownership of the bags, mandating a holding that the State "failed to meet its burden of
demonstrating that the driver had the apparent authority to consent to the search of
Defendant's bags." Id. at \ 22.

B.

Analytical Framework regarding Apparent Authority from State and Federal
Jurisprudence
Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. Katzv. United

States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Consensual
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searches have long been approved by U.S. courts as an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment because "it is no doubt reasonable for the police to
conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so. Florida v. Jirneno, 500 U.S.
248,250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). See also, Schnecklothv.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); and State v.
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). Consent need not be given only by the
defendant. It may come from "a third party who possesses] common authority over or
other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974)). See also
State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, % 11, 131 P.3d 246, affirmed, 2007 UT 23, 156 P.3d
795.
However, a warrantless search is justified even where common authority is
lacking, provided the officer reasonably relied on a third party's demonstration of
apparent authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111
L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). This is so, "[bjecause many situations which confront officers in the
course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for
some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on
facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186,
110 S.Ct. at 2800 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302,
1311, 93 L.Ed.2d 1879 (1949)). Accordingly, apparent authority exists when "the facts
available to the officer at the moment... warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that the consenting party had authority over the premises" or items to be searched. Id, at
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488. See also Duran, 2005 UT App 409 at \14 (If known facts would not cause person
of reasonable caution to conclude that consenting party had Authority, then warrantless
entry/search without further inquiry is unlawful unless actual authority exists.).
Moreover, u[t]he State bears the burden of proving cdmmon authority, and it must
do so by a preponderance of the evidence." Brown, 853 P.2d at 855 (citing Matlock, 415
U.S. at 177-78 n.14, 94 S.Ct. at 996 n.14). See also Rodriquez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110
S.Ct at 2797. The State also has the burden of proving the rjeasonableness of the
officer's actions during an investigative detention. Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at ^j 24
(Thome J., dissent) (quoting State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,123, 164 P.3d 397).
Finally, under Utah law, the State cannot meet its burden of proving apparent or common
authority '" if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without
making further inquiry,'" Duran, 2005 UT App 409 at ^ 16-17 (While officers must
have some room to make mistakes in executing their duties, the mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. With
factual ambiguity present, it was not reasonable to proceed with the warrantless search
absent reasonable inquiry into Mother's mutual use of the trailer) (quoting Davis, 965
P.2d at 533).
This Court granted certiorari in this matter to decide whether the majority of the
panel of the Utah court of appeals erred in its analysis and/or application of the Fourth
Amendment standards governing the apparent authority of a person to consent to the
search of another person's property. To Harding's knowledge, this Court has never
squarely addressed the issue of apparent authority in this or any similar context (although
11

this Court did address the authority of a third person to consent to the search of a
"common area" in Brown, 853 P.2d 851). On the other hand, the court of appeals has
addressed it in Harding, Duran, Davis and Messer.
In Davis, 965 P.2d 525, a case where certiorari review was denied by this Court
(982 P.2d 88), the court of appeals examined whether the right to perform a
consentsearch a probationer's home/property—including common areas—extended to
another resident's property/vehicle. The court concluded that "It is clear... that the
officers conducted their search of the Davis and Hyatt property without any particular
concern for areas over which Hyatt may have possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The officers were faced with what can only be described as an 'ambiguous'
situation concerning whether Davis had common authority over the [vehicle].... [T]he
State failed to show that the officers knew facts which reasonably supported a belief that
Davis had common authority over the [vehicle]. The officers did not have enough
information to determine that the [vehicle] was within Davis' common authority and
therefore subject to search.... We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in failing to
suppress the evidence found in the [vehicle]." Id. at 534-35.
In Duran, 2005 UT App 409, which was affirmed by this court on grounds other
than apparent authority (2007 UT 23), the court of appeals concluded that the evidence
should have been suppressed. There, the officers were faced with an ambiguous situation
concerning a camp trailer. Police had received a report that the defendant was using
drugs on the property and in the trailer. Although the trailer was owned by a third person
(the defendant's mother) and was located on that person's property, it was rented to the
12

defendant. Despite the ambiguity, the officers made no inquiry as to the third person's
mutual use of the trailer or her joint access to it. Instead, they proceeded directly with the
warrantless search of the trailer based upon the consent of the third person. The court of
appeals concluded that "the failure of the officers to make reasonable inquiry in the face
of an ambiguous situation concerning the use of the trailer is fatal to a claim" that it was
reasonable for them to believe that the third person had authority to consent to the search
of the trailer. 2005 UT App 409 atffif2-3, 15-17, 23.
In Messer, 2007 UT App 166, police suspected the defendant and his girlfriend,
Karen Hardy, of producing methamphetamine. After the defendant and Hardy were
arrested for parole violations, Hardy provided police with information that the
methamphetamine lab was located on the property of a third party, Tim Hasch. Police
visited Hasch and he gave the officers permission to search a vehicle located on his
property. Police searched the vehicle's trunk and found several bags. Hasch informed
police that the bags belonged to defendant and that defendant also had a key to the
vehicle. Then, without objection from Hasch, police searched the contents of the bags
and discovered materials for methamphetamine production. The case went to trial and
Messer was convicted of unlawful possession of laboratory equipment, but subsequently
appealed his conviction, claiming in part that his trial counsel was ineffective. 2007 UT
App 166 atfflf2-4. On appeal, the court of appeals considered whether "Hasch's consent
to search the car was insufficient to allow the search of the Defendant's bags stored in the
trunk's car." Id. at f 20. The court of appeals concluded the search was valid because by
"leaving the bags in Hasch's car on Hasch's property, Defendant took the risk that Hasch
13

might not maintain Defendant's privacy interest in the bags." Id. at TJ 22. Essentially,
defendant abandoned his expectation to privacy in his property by leaving it in Hasch's
vehicle.
The closest applicable United States Supreme Court case appears to be Jimeno,
which was relied upon almost exclusively by the trial court. In Jimeno, police overheard
the defendant arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone.
The officer followed his car and stopped him for a traffic violation (making a right turn at
a red light without stopping). 500 U.S. at 249, 111 S.Ct. at 103. The officer told the
defendant he had been stopped for committing a traffic violation. The officer went on to
say that he had reason to believe that narcotics were being carried in the car, and asked
permission to search the vehicle. The defendant indicated he had nothing to hide and
consented to the search. Id. After the occupants of the vehicle exited, the officer went to
the passenger side, opened the door, and saw a folded, brown paper bag on the
floorboard. He picked up the bag, opened it, and found a kilogram of cocaine inside. Id.
Before trial the defendant moved to suppress the cocaine on grounds that his
consent to search did not extend to the closed paper bag inside the car. Id. The United
States Supreme Court certiorari and looked at "whether it is reasonable for an officer to
consider a suspect's general consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a
paper bag lying on the floor of the car." Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1804. The
Court stated that, "The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object." Id.
(citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)). The
Court went on to conclude:
14

In this case, the terms of the search's authorization were simple. [Defendant]
granted Officer Trujillo permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit
limitation on the scope of the search. Trujillo had informed [defendant] that he
believed [defendant] was carrying narcotics, and that he would be looking for
narcotics in the car. We think that it was objectively [reasonable for the police to
conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to
search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person
may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a
container. 'Contraband goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car.'
[Ross, 456 U.S.] at 820, 102 S.Ct. at 2170. The authorization to search in this
case, therefore, extended beyond the surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag
lying on the car's floor.
500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1804.
However, there are some important distinctions in Jirneno that the trial court, and
to a certain extent, the majority of the court of appeals, failed to recognize. First, the
search in Jimeno was based on more than mere consent. There, the officers also had—at
a minimum—reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, i.e. illegal possession/trafficking
in narcotics. Two, the U.S. court did not address the issue ota third-party's authority to
consent to the warrantless search of another's property. Instead the court examined
"whether it is reasonable for an officer to consider a suspect's general consent to a search
of his car to include consent to examine a paper bag lying on the floor of the car." 500
U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct at 1804. See State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5,118, 621 N.W.2d 891
15

("The question of whether a driver's consent to the search of a vehicle justifies the
warrantless search of a passenger's belongings within the vehicle has not been addressed
by the United States Supreme Court"). Finally, there is a conflict between jurisdictions as
to whether a driver's consent to the search of a vehicle justifies a warrantless search of a
passenger's belongings. See State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, n.3, 621 N.W.2d 891; and
State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Minn. 2002) (summarizing cases on each side of
the issue).

C.

Under these facts, the Driver Lacked Apparent Authority to Consent to the
Search of Harding's Property, Particularly as it was Not Reasonable for
Officer Westerman to Search those Bags without Making Further Inquiry
The "question presented in this case involves the driver's authority to consent to

the search of [Harding's] bags." Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at ^f 23 (J. Thorne, dissenting)
(emphasis in original). The majority of the court of appeals concluded that it was
reasonable for police to believe that the driver had authority to consent to the search of
the bags because: there was nothing on or about the bags to indicate they belonged to
anyone else, neither the driver nor the passengers informed the officer of where they had
been or where they were going nor did they state the bags belonged to anyone other than
the driver, and no one objected to the search. Id. at ^ 19. "Under these circumstances/'
the majority concluded, "it was objectively reasonable for Officer Westerman to believe
the bags belonged to the driver. Any belief that the bags belonged to one of the
passengers would necessarily be based on speculation. On the other hand, it is patently
reasonable to believe that a car owner would toss or place bags or other items in a small
16

storage area of a car, located behind the passenger seat. We therefore conclude that...
search of [Harding's] bags was lawful" Id.
However, the "storage area" at issue here is that of an SUV, which is typically
more open and easily accessible from the backseat. Moreovpr, the bags were located
directly behind Harding. In addition, when the driver consented to the search of the
vehicle it was done outside and away from the car while Handing and the other
passengers were inside the vehicle. Westerman never informed the passengers he would
be searching the vehicle and never inquired of anyone as to ownership of the bags,
although they could have belonged to any of the four indivicfuals present. In addition, he
never asked them about where they had been or where they Ivere going, nor did he inform
them why he was searching or for what he was looking. He simply searched the vehicle
and the bags with "no way of knowing whose bags they were." R. 70.
The majority, in part, relied upon its earlier decision in Messer. However, in that
case, the defendant was not present at the scene during the search of the car. The vehicle
in Messer belonged to the third party consenter (although the defendant had a key to the
car), was located on the third person's property, and only the third party was present
during the search. Essentially, the defendant had abandoned his property by leaving them
in another's vehicle thereby running the risk that the other might not maintain the
defendant's privacy interest. That is not this case. Harding was present at the scene of
the search, along with the driver and two other passengers.
Another important consideration is that the search in this case was based solely on
consent. Unlike, Messer, Duron, and Jimeno, Officer Westerman had no probable cause
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or even reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior on the part of the driver or the
passengers, including Harding.
In the court of appeals, Harding argued the appropriateness of applying the ruling
of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002). Harding argued this case because it addresses an almost identical fact pattern as is
present here.
In Frank, a vehicle was stopped for having only one working headlight. 650
N.W.2d at 215. There were two passengers in the vehicle, including the defendant. In
response to a question as to the group's destination, the officer became suspicious of drug
activity. He gave the driver a "fix-it" ticket, separated the individuals in the car, and
questioned them further. Id. Out of appellant's hearing, the Officer asked the
owner/driver for permission to search the vehicle for "multiple things, bodies, weapons,
guns, drugs." Id. The owner/driver consented. After searching all but the area of the
backseat where the other passenger remained seated, the officer opened the trunk of the
vehicle and found two suitcases. The officer did not ask who owned the suitcases and did
not ask permission from the passengers to search the suitcases, but searched them based
on the consent of the owner/driver. Id. In one of the suitcases he found what appeared to
be controlled substances and a handgun. The officer subsequently learned that the
suitcase belonged to the defendant/appellant. Id.
In Frank, the State argued that under Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 99 S.Ct.
1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), the "consent search of the suitcase did not violate the
warrant requirement because the officer had an objectively reasonable belief that the
18

driver's consent extended to the suitcases." 650 N.W.2d at 217. The Minnesota court
then summarized the Jimeno case, similar to what the trial court did here, and stated as
follows: "[T]he Court also specifically indicated that although it may be reasonable to
search a paper bag on the floor of a vehicle, it may not be reasonable to search a locked
briefcase found in the trunk of a car. [Jimeno, 500 U.S.] at 251-52, 111 S.Ct. at 1804.
Each case depends on what is an objectively reasonable belief for the officer to hold in a
particular situation. M a t 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04." Frank, 650N.W.2dat 217.
The Frank court then examined cases from other jurisdictions on the in regards to
the question of whether a driver's consent to the search of a vehicle justifies the
warrantless search of a passenger's belongings inside the vehicle, and held: "We
conclude that the cases holding that a driver's consent to search a motor vehicle does not
extend to property owned by passengers who are present and available to consent to the
search of their property are more consistent with constitutional limits on warrantless
searches that the cases that conclude otherwise." 650 N.W.2d at 218-19 (citing Brown v.
State, 789 So.2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 2001) (holding that driver's consent to
search vehicle was not valid third-party consent for search of items such as purses or
fanny packs possessed by passengers when it is clear that the owner of the item is present
and available to consent)). The court in Frank concluded further that, "when a vehicle
search is based only on consent, an officer has an obligation to ascertain the ownership of
items not owned by or within the control of the consenter when the circumstances do not
clearly indicate that the consenter is the owner or controls the item to be searched.
Because the officer lacked consent for the search of appellant's suitcase, the district court
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clearly erred by denying appellant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his
suitcase;' 650 N.W.2d at 219.
Like in Frank, the driver in this case was asked for consent to search the car
outside of her hearing. The driver was outside the vehicle while Harding and the other
two passengers remained inside the vehicle. In both cases the search was conducted
based upon the consent of the driver. In Frank, however, the officer questioned each of
the vehicle's occupants and became suspicious of drug activity. Here, Officer
Westerman had no suspicion of any criminal activity outside of the initial traffic
violation. Westerman also testified that the bags were located in a small space for storage
directly behind where Harding was sitting, but that he did not ask whom the bags
belonged to before he searched them (R. 112:8, 16). Moreover, Westerman's only
comment to the passengers including Harding was that they should exit the vehicle and
"wait with that other officer, while [he] to a look in the vehicle" (R. 112: 15). Westerman
did not explain to the driver what he wished to search for when he obtained her consent,
nor did he tell the passengers. In fact, he failed to even mention to the passengers that he
was searching the vehicle based on the driver's consent. Even in denying Harding's
motion to suppress, the trial court found that "Officer Westerman had no way of knowing
whose bags they were; he just proceeded to search the contents of the vehicle." R. 70.
The majority of the court of appeals disagreed with Harding's application of Frank
because "we believe that Frank's requirement is too sweeping." Harding, 2010 UT App
8 a t ! 17.
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Judge Thome, on the other hand, saw no need to rely on Frank because he "would
suppress the results of the search of Defendant's bags under existing Utah law." Id. at ^f
28. Nonetheless, Judge Thorne uagree[d] with the logic and analysis of Frank and
note[d] that its common-sense holding is itself merely another way of stating Utah's law
that a consent search based on apparent authority is not valid in the face of ambiguity of
ownership or control." Id.
Judge Thorne dissented based upon a couple of factors: One, because "It is
undisputed in this case that the driver did not have actual authority to consent to the
search of [Harding's] bags. Thus, in order for the State to justify the search, it must
demonstrate that the facts known to Officer Westerman would nevertheless have caused a
person of reasonable caution to conclude that the driver had such authority." Harding,
2010 UT App 8 at 125 (citing State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, % 14, 131 P.3d 246,
affirmed, 2007 UT 23, 156 P.3d 795 and Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110
S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). Two, because the trial court expressly found that
the officer had no way of knowing who the bags belonged to, and "the only indicia of
ownership or control of the bags was their mere presence in the driver's vehicle, along
with multiple passengers and in an area accessible to those passengers." Harding, 2010
UT App 8 atfflf22, 25. Under these known facts, Thorne concluded, that "[a]t best,
Officer Westerman was presented with a situation where ownership and control of the
bag was ambiguous. Utah law requires further inquiry before a consent search can be
deemed valid in such ambiguous situations." Id. at 126 (citing Duran, 2005 UT App 409
at % 17, and State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 533 (Utah App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d
21

88 (Utah 1999)). Westerman made no further inquiry and therefore, he lacked a
reasonable belief as to the driver's ownership of the bags, mandating a holding that the
State "failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the driver had the apparent
authority to consent to the search of Defendant's bags." Id at ^J 22.
Harding asserts that Judge Thorne is correct and urges this Court to conclude as he
did. His conclusions are the right conclusions under Utah law. The analysis and
requirements from his dissent and from the court of appeals panels in Davis and Duran
concerning the need for further inquiry when ambiguity is present in cases involving
common or apparent authority is workable, sensible, and strikes a good balance between
an individuals right to privacy and law enforcements need to maintain order and prevent
crime—particularly here where there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Harding asks that this Court reverse the decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals, reverse her conviction for possession of a controlled substance
and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and remand this matter
back to the Fourth District Court with instructions that her pleas may be withdrawn and
the evidence suppressed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8 TH day of November, 2010.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Petitioner
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H
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Tina HARDING, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20080772-CA.
Jan. 22,2010.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 2010.
Background: Defendant was convicted pursuant to
conditional guilty pleas in the Fourth District Court,
Provo Department, Claudia La>cock, J., of illegal
possession or use of a controlled substance and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. Defendant appealed.

legality of a search and seizure because there must
be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement
and prosecutorial officials. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend
4.
[2] Automobiles 48A €^>349(14.1)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48A|c349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
4isAk349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
18Ak349(14.1) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases
Automobiles 48A € ^ 3 4 9 ( 1 7 )

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J.,
held that:
(1) encounter of occupants of vehicle with officer
de-escalated from investigatory detention to consensual encounter, and
(2) search of defendant's bags was based on a reasonable belief that they belonged to driver of vehicle
and that driver had authority to consent to their
search.
Affirmed.
Thorne, J., dissented and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 110 € ^ 1 1 3 4 3 5
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110XXIV(L)4 Scope of Inquiry
1 lOkl 134.35 k. Searches and seizures.
Most Cited Cases
An appellate court affords little discretion to the
district court's determination in cases involving the

48A Automobiles
48AVI1 Offenses
48AVII($) Prosecution
48AK349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(!7) k. Detention, and
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases
Reasonable traffic stops are allowed if the purpose
of the stop is limited and the resulting detention
quite brief. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[31 Automobiles 48A C^>349(10)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(10) k. What is arrest or
seizure; stop distinguished. Most Cited Cases
When a traffic stop occurs, the driver of the car is
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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[4] Automobiles 48A € ^ 3 4 9 ( 1 0 )

48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry

48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVH(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(10) k. What is arrest or
seizure; stop distinguished. Most Cited Cases
A passenger of a car is seized when a traffic stop
occurs and so may challenge the constitutionality of
the stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[5] Automobiles 48A €^>349(10)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(10) k. What is arrest or
seizure; stop distinguished. Most Cited Cases
Seizure of driver or passenger of vehicle continues
for the duration of a traffic stop. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
[6] Automobiles 48A €^>349(2.1)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(2) Grounds
48Ak349(2.1) k. In general. Most
Cited Cases
Generally speaking, a traffic stop for a traffic violation observed by an officer is justified. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 4.
[7] Automobiles 48A €=^349(17)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit

48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases
Once the purpose of the initial traffic stop is concluded, the person must be allowed to depart.
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend.4.
[8] Automobiles 48A €^>349(10)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVIKB) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(10) k. What is arrest or
seizure; stop distinguished. Most Cited Cases
Automobiles 48A €^>349(17)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases
A traffic stop that begins as a seizure may deescalate to a mere consensual encounter. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmend. 4.
[9] Automobiles 48A €=>349(17)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases
Any investigatory traffic stop may properly be determined to have de-escalated to a consensual en-
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counter when a reasonable person would believe,
based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or
she is free to end the encounter and depart.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
[10] Automobiles 48A €^>349(17)
48A Automobiles
48AV1I Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases
An encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be
deemed to have de-escalated into consensual encounter, for Fourth Amendment purposes, unless
the driver's documents have been returned to her.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
[11] Automobiles 48A € ^ 3 4 9 ( 1 7 )
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases
In determining whether encounter initiated by a
traffic stop has de-escalated into consensual encounter, a court, if the driver's documents have
been returned, considers factors tending to show
de-escalation, including informing a person she is
free to leave, or that she does not have to answer
additional questions. U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4.
[12] Automobiles 48A €^>349(17)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution

48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349( 14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases
In determining whether encounter initiated by a
traffic stop has de-escalated into consensual encounter, factors that weigh against de-escalation include failure to issue a warning or citation before
engaging in additional questioning and a coercive
show of authority, such as the presence of more
than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical
touching by the officer, or the officer's use of a
commanding tbne of voice indicating that compliance might be compelled. U.S.CA. ConstAmend.
4.
[13] Automobiles 48A €^>349(17)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offjenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
48Ak349(17) k. Detention, and
length and character thereof. Most Cited Cases
Automobiles 48A €^>349(18)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
48Ak349(14) Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
&Ak349(18) k. Inquiry; license,
registration, or Warrant checks. Most Cited Cases
Encounter of occupants of vehicle with officer, who
initiated traffic stop for equipment violation, deescalated from investigatory detention to consensual encounter, before officer asked driver if he could
look in her vehicle; driver's documents had been re-
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turned to her and she was cited for violations, there
was distinct break in encounter when officer told
driver she was free to leave, officers' vehicles'
emergency lights were off, and there was no indication that officers' weapons were displayed, that officers touched driver or passengers, or that officer
used commanding tone of voice, as would suggest
coercion. U.S.C.A ConstAmend. 4.
[14] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>186
349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349k 186 k. Scope and duration of consent;
withdrawal. Most Cited Cases
Search of bags of defendant, who was passenger in
vehicle stopped for traffic violations, was based on
a reasonable belief that they belonged to driver and
that driver had authority to consent to their search;
officer, during search of vehicle, found two bags
and various loose items in cargo space behind back
seat of vehicle, there was nothing on or about bags
to indicate they belonged to anyone other than
driver, none of the vehicle's occupants stated that
bags belonged to anyone other than driver, and no
one objected to search. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
[15] Searches and Seizures 349 €^>186
349 Searches and Seizures
349V Waiver and Consent
349k 186 k. Scope and duration of consent;
withdrawal. Most Cited Cases
If a person consents to a general search of their
property, within which is contained property owned
by another person, the consent is valid so long as
the consenting party has authority over the area or
has a sufficient relationship to the premises or effects
sought to be inspected.
U.S.CA.
ConstAmend. 4.
*1149 Margaret Lindsay, Spanish Fork, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen. and Marian Decker,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Before Judges THORNE, BENCH, and GREENFNT
WOOD.
FN1. Judges Russell W. Bench and Pamela
T. Greenwood heard and voted on this case
as regular members of the Utah Court of
Appeals. They both retired from the court
on January 1, 2010, before this decision issued. Hence, they are designated herein as
Senior Judges. See Utah Code Ann. §
78A-3-103(2) (2008); Sup.Ct. R. of Profl
Practice 11-201(6).

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
J 1 Defendant Tina Harding appeals her convictions
for illegal possession or use of a controlled substance and possession of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person. These charges stem from the
search of a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger. Specifically, she appeals the trial court's
denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained
during the search, arguing that the search of her
bags, which were inside the rear storage compartment of the vehicle, was *1150 a violation of her
Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
5 2 Defendant was a passenger in her friend's
vehicle when Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a
traffic stop for an equipment violation because the
vehicle's plate lamp was inoperable. Officer Westerman ran a routine check on the driver and learned
that she did not have a valid driver license. He then
requested the names and birth dates of each of the
three passengers and discovered that none of them
had a valid driver license.
Officer Westerman
asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a
citation for an inoperable plate lamp and driving
without a license. He then told her she was free to
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leave, but advised her to contact someone to come
drive the vehicle because none of the passengers
had a valid driver license. The driver began to walk
toward her vehicle but returned to ask Officer
Westerman a question. At that point, Officer Westerman asked her if he could look in the vehicle and
she consented. Officer Westerman asked the passengers to exit the vehicle and told them they could
wait with the backup officer "if they wanted." This
second officer arrived before Officer Westerman
completed his investigation and prior to the driver
consenting to a search. The emergency lights on
both of the officers' vehicles were off before the
driver exited her vehicle.
FN2. Defendant initially gave a false name
to Officer Westerman.
5 3 During Officer Westerman's search of the
FN3
vehicle he found a brown bag and a blue bag
in the cargo space behind the back seat of the
vehicle. Before searching the bags, Officer Westerman did not ask to whom they belonged, and none
of the passengers claimed ownership of them. There
were no visible indications on the bags that they belonged to anyone other than the driver. The bags
contained drugs and drug paraphernalia and other
items indicating the bags belonged to Defendant.
Officer Westerman then searched Defendant and
found a lock blade knife with a three-inch blade.
Officer Westerman arrested Defendant and gave her
Miranda warnings.
FN3. Although Defendant describes the
bags as backpacks in her briefs, Officer
Westerman testified that they were bags.
He was the only witness who testified.
J 4 Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, but
the trial court denied the motion. Defendant entered
conditional guilty pleas, see State v. Sery, 758 P.2d
935, 938-40 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (discussing and
expressly authorizing guilty pleas conditioned upon
the ability to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress evidence), and now appeals.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[ 11 5 5 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to suppress evidence because
the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal
search and seizure. We afford little discretion to the
district court's determination in cases involving the
legality of a search and seizure "because there must
be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement
and prosecutorial officials." State v. Hansen, 2002
UT 125, 5 26, 63 P.3d 650 (internal quotation
marks omitted)!.

ANALYSIS
I. The Initial Detention De-escalated to a Consensual Encounter
[2|[3](4|[5|[6| J 6 Unreasonable searches are prohibited by the I Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. See U.S. Const, amend. IV.
This protection extends to automobile stops, although reasonable traffic stops are allowed if the
"purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
When a traffic stop occurs, "the driver of the car is
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment .... [and] a passenger is seized as well and so
may challenge the constitutionality of the stop."
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127
S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). That seizure
continues "[f]or the duration of a traffic stop." Arizona v. Johnson, — U.S. —-, —-, 129 S.Ct. 781,
782, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). Generally*! 151
speaking, a traffic stop for a traffic violation observed by an officer is justified. See Hansen, 2002
UT 125, 5 30, 63 P.3d 650. Recognizing this principle, the parties in this case stipulated that the initial traffic stop was a legally valid investigatory detention.
17] [8] [9] 5 7 "Once the purpose of the initial stop is
concluded ... the person must be allowed to depart."
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Id. J 31. Further, "[a] traffic stop that begins as a
seizure may de-escalate to a mere consensual encounter." Id. 5 33. Thus, we consider whether the
vehicle occupants' encounter with Officer Westerman had de-escalated from an investigatory detention to a consensual encounter before Officer Westerman asked the driver if he could look in her
vehicle. Any investigatory traffic stop may properly
be determined to have "de-escalate[d] to a consensual encounter when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances,
that he or she is free to end the encounter and depart." Id. 5 39.
[10|1111[12| J 8 In State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,
63 P.3d 650, the Utah Supreme Court addressed deescalations to consensual encounters. By definition,
" 'an encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not
be deemed consensual unless the driver's documents have been returned to [her].' " Id. 5 40
(quoting United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973,
979 (10th Cir.1996)). If the driver's documents
have been returned, we consider "factors tending to
show de-escalation," including "informing a person
[s]he is free to leave, or that [s]he does not have to
answer additional questions." Id. 5 41. By contrast,
factors that weigh against de-escalation include
"failure to issue a warning or citation before engaging in additional questioning" and "a coercive
show of authority, such as the presence of more
than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical
touching by the officer, or [the officer's] use of a
commanding tone of voice indicating that compliance might be compelled." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
J 9 In Hansen, the supreme court reversed this
court's decision that a traffic stop had de-escalated
to a consensual encounter, determining that there
was no noticeable break between the initial traffic
stop and the further questioning unrelated to the
purpose for the traffic stop. See id. 5 68. In addition, the officer did not address the traffic violations before questioning the defendant about possible contraband and did not tell the defendant he

was free to leave. See id. 5 45. Because the supreme
court "questioned] whether a reasonable person
would feel free to leave before being issued a warning or citation, or at least being told he or she could
leave," id., it concluded that the "detention had not
de-escalated to a consensual encounter at the time
of the additional questioning; and thus, [the defendant] was illegally seized," id. 5 46.
[13) Jf 10 In this case, however, the driver's documents had been returned to her and she was cited
for the equipment violation and lack of a driver license. Further, there was a distinct break in the encounter when Officer Westerman told the driver she
was free to leave. At that point, the purpose of the
traffic stop had clearly been concluded. However,
the driver then approached Officer Westerman to
ask a question. While it is true that there was a
backup officer present, the facts do not suggest coercion. For example, the officers' vehicles' emergency lights were off, and there is no indication that
the officers' weapons were displayed, that the officers touched the driver or the passengers, or that
the officer used a commanding tone of voice. See
id. J 41 (listing these criteria as examples of behavior that would indicate coercion).
5 11 We conclude that, under these circumstances,
the driver would have reasonably felt free to leave
and, therefore, the encounter had de-escalated to a
consensual encounter. See id. 33 33-34. Thereafter,
the driver consented to a search of the vehicle. Although Defendant lacked standing to object to the
search because she did not own or exercise authority over the vehicle, the State stipulated that she
had standing to challenge the search of her bags because she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the bags and did not abandon them. Thus, we turn
to the legality of the search of Defendant's *1152
ubags. FN?
FN4. Defendant's primary argument pertaining to the legality of the search is that
there was no de-escalation from the seizure
resulting from the traffic stop. We have determined that de-escalation did occur prior
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to the driver consenting to the search and
that Defendant lacks standing to object to
the consent to search the vehicle. However,
Defendant also argued to the trial court,
and briefly on appeal, that the seizure of
the passengers continued during the
vehicle search because the passengers
could not have reasonably believed they
were free to leave. The trial court rejected
this argument as irrelevant because Defendant could not object to the vehicle
search because she did not own the
vehicle. Defendant cites no authority addressing whether, when the traffic stop is
over from the driver's standpoint, it is also
over for any passengers. Furthermore, Defendant does not address how, if at all, deescalation as to the driver from a valid
traffic stop to a consensual encounter affects her status as a passenger. In this respect, Defendant's brief is inadequate. See
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313
(Utah 1998) (noting that generally we will
not address an inadequately briefed argument).
Our analysis assumes that, as is the case
here, nothing happened to raise any suspicions about the vehicle's passengers.
The only facts of record that would indicate a continued detention of the passengers is Officer Westerman's request
that they exit the vehicle and suggestion
that they stand by the second officer
while Officer Westerman conducted the
search. Nothing occurred that would
cause Officer Westerman to suspect Defendant or the other passengers of illegal
activity or to believe that they had a
basis to object to a search of the vehicle
or its contents. Given these circumstances and the lack of adequate briefing
by Defendant, we decline to further address this possible issue. See id.

II. The Search of Defendant's Bags Was Legal
[ 14| 5 12 Our analysis of the legality of the search
of Defendant's bags begins with the question of
whether it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to
conclude that the driver's consent extended to Defendant's personal belongings. As noted above, the
State concedes that Defendant has standing to challenge whether the officer had a reasonable belief
that the drivers consent to search the vehicle extended to Defendant's bags.
[15| J 13 In Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111
S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he standard for
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under
the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person
have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Id. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801
(citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89,
110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). In Jimeno, the car driver consented to a search and the
officer searched a folded, brown paper bag located
on the floor of the car, discovering cocaine in the
bag. See id. The Court examined whether the consent extended to the paper bag and concluded "that
it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search [the] car included consent to search containers within that car
which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may
be expected to know that narcotics are generally
carried in sonie form of a container." Id. Furthermore, if a person consents to a general search of
their property, within which is contained property
owned by another person, the consent is valid so
long as the consenting party has authority over the
area or has a "sufficient relationship to the premises
or effects sought to be inspected." State v. Messer,
2007 UT App 166,3 21, 164 P.3d 421.
5 14 The critical inquiry then is whether the police
officer reasonably believed that the consenting
party has sufficient authority to consent to the
search. In State v. Messer, 2007 UT App 166, 164
P.3d 421, the police searched a car located on a
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third party's property with the property owner's
consent and discovered contraband in bags in the
car's trunk belonging to the defendant. See id. 3 4.
This court noted that common authority over property was not necessarily dependent on ownership,
but could also be established by possession. See id.
5 22. The search and seizure were upheld
"[b]ecause the officers could have, at the very least,
reasonably believed that [the property owner] had
authority to consent to a search of the car trunk and
its contents." Id. 5 23.
3 15 The State cites cases holding that a driver's
consent to a vehicle search extends to the property
of a third person in the vehicle when the property
does not clearly belong to a person other than the
driver. *1153 See United States v. Hammons, 152
F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir.1998) (noting that the defendant's garment bag was properly searched where
the defendant's wife consented to the vehicle search
and the officers did not see identifying tags on the
bag, reasonably believing that the bag belonged to
the defendant's wife); State v. Sawyer, 147 N.H.
191, 784 A.2d 1208, 1212-13 (2001) (holding officers reasonably believed driver had authority to
consent to search of bag belonging to defendant);
State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 627 A.2d 1066,
1070 (1993) (stating officers had reasonable belief
driver had authority to consent to search of luggage
in vehicle trunk where there were no indications
luggage belonged to passengers). The State further
contends that because the ultimate test of a search's
legality is objective reasonableness, police officers
are not required to seek permission to open each
closed container during a consensual vehicle
search, because consent to search a vehicle "is
equivalent to general consent to search the vehicle
and its contents, including containers such as luggage," United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 484
(5th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Rich, 992
F.2d502,508(5thCir.l993)).
J 16 Defendant disagrees with the State's application of this case law and argues that the driver's
consent in this case did not extend to Defendant's

bags located in the rear of the car. In support of that
argument Defendant urges us to adopt the rule applied in State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213
(Minn.Ct.App.2002). There, a vehicle was stopped
for having only one working headlight. See id. at
215. After citing the driver for the equipment violation, the officer became suspicious of drug activity,
separated the individuals in the car, and asked the
driver for and received permission to search the
vehicle. See id. The officer opened the trunk of the
vehicle and found two suitcases. See id. The officer
did not ask who owned the suitcases and did not
ask permission from the passengers to search the
suitcases. See id. The officer found drugs and later
learned that the suitcase belonged to the defendant,
a passenger in the vehicle. See id. The Minnesota
court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions and
"conclude[d] that the cases holding that a driver's
consent to search a motor vehicle does not extend
to property owned by passengers who are present
and available to consent to the search of their property are more consistent with constitutional limits
on warrantless searches than the cases that conclude
otherwise." Id. at 218-219. The Minnesota court
held that, "when a vehicle search is based only on
consent, an officer has an obligation to ascertain the
ownership of items not owned by or within the control of the consenter when the circumstances do not
clearly indicate that the consenter is the owner or
controls the items to be searched." Id. at 219.
J 17 Here, Defendant argues that a reasonable person in Officer Westerman's position would reasonably believe that the bags belonged to one of the
three passengers rather than to the driver. The presence of the three passengers and the location of the
bags in the small storage space behind the rear passenger seat would lead to that reasonable belief.
Under these circumstances, Defendant asserts, Officer Westerman should have inquired about the
bags' ownership and sought consent to search from
anyone who asserted ownership. Defendant contends that without having done so, Officer Westerman's search of the bags was illegal. We do not
agree, and we believe that Frank's requirement is
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too sweeping.
5 18 As acknowledged in Frank, in determining
what justifies a legal search, "[e]ach case depends
on what is an objectively reasonable belief for the
officer to hold in a particular situation." Id. at 217
(citing Florida v. Juneno, 500 U.S. 248, 251. Ill
S.Ct. 1801, 114 LEd2d 297 (1991)). If items in a
vehicle clearly do not belong to a consenting driver
and there are passengers who may likely own the
items, the driver's consent to search would not reasonably extend to those items. Examples might include an item with a label or tag indicating ownership, or a purse, when there is a male driver and a
female passenger. See United States v. Welch, 4
F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that under the
circumstances it was not reasonable for officers to
believe male driver had authority to consent to
search of his passenger/girlfriend's purse). Other
situations where the vehicle's contents are more
*1154 anonymous would likely lead to an objectively reasonable belief that the consenting driver
owned and/or exercised control over the vehicle
and items contained therein.
5 19 The particulars of the situation in this case
lead us to conclude that the search of Defendant's
bags was based on a reasonable belief that they belonged to the driver and that the driver had authority to consent to their search. These particulars include the following, taken from the brief testimony
of Officer Westerman, the only witness called to
testify: (1) there was a small storage area in the rear
of the car behind the backseat; (2) items in this
storage area included a brown bag and a dark blue
bag, and various loose items; (3) there was nothing
on or about the bags to indicate they belonged to
anyone other than the driver; (4) the vehicle's occupants consisted of the driver and three passengers;
(5) neither the driver nor any of the passengers informed Officer Westerman about where they had
been or where they were going; (6) none of the
vehicle's occupants stated that the bags belonged to
anyone other than the driver; and (7) no one objected to the search. Under these circumstances it was

objectively reasonable for Officer Westerman to
believe the bags belonged to the driver. Any belief
that the bags belonged to one of the passengers
would necessarily be based on speculation. On the
other hand, it is patently reasonable to believe that
a car owner would toss or place bags or other items
in a small storage area of a car, located behind the
passenger sea);. We therefore conclude that under
these circumstances, search of Defendant's bags
was lawful.
5 20 Affirmedl
5 21 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Senior
Judge.
THORNE, Judge (dissenting):
5 22 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, as I cannot agree with its conclusion that the
search of Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's
consent was permissible. Here, the trial court expressly found that, under the circumstances, Officer
Westerman "had no way of knowing whose bags
they were." Accordingly, I disagree that Officer
Westerman can be said to have had a reasonable belief as to the driver's ownership of the bags, and I
would hold th^t the State failed to meet its burden
of demonstrating that the driver had the apparent
authority to consent to the search of Defendant's
bags.
S 23 Both the trial court and, to a lesser extent, the
majority opinion treat this as a case about the scope
of the driver's cjonsent. It is not. There is no dispute
that, had the bags belonged to the driver, permission to search the bags would have been included
within the scope of her consent to search the car.
See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct.
1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) ("We think that it
was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondents' car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs."). Rather, the
question presented in this case involves the driver's
authority to consent to the search of the bags.
J 24 " 'If a third party rather than the defendant
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consents to a search, the third party must be one
who possesses "common authority" over the area or
has some other "sufficient relationship to the
premises or effects sought to be inspected " ' "
State v Messer 2007 UT App 166, 5 21 164 P 3d
421 (quoting State \ B/own 853 P 2d 851, 855
(Utah 1992)) "Moreover, a search is valid even in
instances where the third party does not possess
common authority, as long as the police
'reasonably beheve[ ]' " that the third party possesses such authority Id (alteration in original)
(quoting Illinois v Rodriguez 497 US 177, 189,
110 S Ct 2793, 111 L Ed 2d 148 (1990)) However,
the State bears the burden of establishing that one
who consents to a search has the authority to do so
See Brown, 853 P 2d at 855 ("The State bears the
burden of proving common authority, and it must
do so by a preponderance of the evidence."), see
also State v Worwood, 2007 UT 47,3 23, 164 P 3d
397 ("When challenged, the [S]tate has the burden
of proving the reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative detention ")
S 25 It is undisputed in this case that the driver did
not have actual authority to consent* 1155 to the
FN5
search of Defendant's bags.
Thus, in order for
the State to justify the search, it must demonstrate
that the facts known to Officer Westerman would
nevertheless have caused a person of reasonable
caution to conclude that the driver had such authority. Cf. State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409,5 14, 131
P.3d 246 ("If the facts known to the officers would
not cause a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the consenting party had authority over
the premises, 'then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually
exists' " (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U S . at 188-89,
110 S.Ct. 2793)). It appears that the only indicia of
ownership or control of the bags was their mere
presence in the driver's vehicle, along with multiple
passengers and in an area accessible to those passengers. As the trial court aptly found, this information alone gave Officer Westerman "no way of
knowing whose bags they were."

FN5 The trial court found that Defendant
had not abandoned her bags and retained a
legitimate expectation of privacy in them
Further, this is not a case where Defendant
left her bags in the care of a third person
and thereby took the risk that the third per
son might not respect her privacy See,
e g , State v Messer 2007 UT App 166, 5
22, 164 P 3d 421 ("[I]n leaving the bags in
Hasch's car on Hasch's
property,
[defendant took the risk that Hasch might
not maintain [defendant's privacy interest
in the bags "), see also United States v
Austin, 66 F 3d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir 1995)
("By leaving his bag in the possession and
control of [a third party], defendant assumed the risk that [the third party] would
allow the authorities access to the bag ")
5 26 At best, Officer Westerman was presented
with a situation where ownership and control of the
bags was ambiguous. Utah law requires further inquiry before a consent search can be deemed valid
in such ambiguous situations. See id J 17 ("The officers were faced with an ambiguous situation concerning the trailer. Although it was owned by
Mother, it was rented to Horvath. Despite that ambiguity, the officers made no further inquiry and
proceeded with the warrantless [consent] search.
The search was not lawful ...." (footnote omitted));
State v Davis, 965 P 2d 525, 533 (Utah
Ct.App.1998) (stating that the State's burden to
prove common authority cannot be met" 'if agents,
faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless
proceed without making further inquiry' " (quoting
United States v Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075
(D.C.Cir.1991))).
J 27 Had Officer Westerman made further inquiry,
he could likely have easily ascertained that the bags
belonged to Defendant and sought her consent to
search them. If further inquiry had resulted in the
passengers, including Defendant, denying ownership of the bags, then Officer Westerman would
have had some reason to believe that the bags be-
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longed to the driver. Or, had everyone denied ownership of the bags, then perhaps an abandonment
analysis would have been appropriate. See generally State v Rvnhart, 2005 UT 84. 9 21, 125 P.3d
938 (discussing abandonment); see also United
States v Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 (9th
Cir.1981) (finding abandonment where the defendant disclaimed ownership of a wallet found on the
seat of a vehicle). Here, however, Officer Westerman made no inquiry whatsoever and, thus, his
search of Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's
consent cannot be deemed objectively reasonable
under Utah case law governing consent searches.

App 8
hNu (

J 28 Because I would suppress the results of the
search of Defendant's bags under existing Utah case
law, I see no need to rely on Defendant's primary
source of authority, State v. Frank, 650 N.W.2d 213
(Minn.Ct.App.2002). However, I agree with the logic and analysis of Frank and note that its commonsense holding is itself merely another way of stating
Utah's law that a consent search based on apparent
authority is not valid in the face of ambiguity of
ownership or control. See id. at 219 ("[W]hen a
vehicle search is based only on consent, an officer
has an obligation to ascertain the ownership of
items not owned by or within the control of the
consenter when the circumstances do not clearly indicate that the consenter is the owner or controls
the item to be searched.").
J 29 When Officer Westerman searched Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's consent, he had
"no way of knowing whose bags they were." Faced
with this ambiguity as to whose bags they were, Officer Westerman's*1156 search, without further inquiry, is objectively unreasonable and, therefore,
unlawful. See Duran, 2005 UT App 409, J 17, 131
P.3d 246; Davis, 965 P.2d at 533. For these reasons, I would suppress the results of the search and
reverse Defendant's resulting convictions, and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
UtahApp.,2010.
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